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Abstract
This paper analyses the integration of active labour market policies for two groups of unemployed from 
a theoretical perspective. In general a model with only one type of agent performs better than a model with 
two types of agents. If there are two types of agents part of the effort of one agent leaks away to the other 
agent and decreases the incentives to get the unemployed back to work. A model where two agents work 
together and serve both types of unemployed performs even worse. This is because they are only partially 
compensated for their effort, which decreases the incentives to get the unemployed back to work even more. Page ● 8
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1. Introduction
In many western societies social assistance and unemployment beneﬁ  ts are two separate beneﬁ  t regimes 
with separate administrators. Unemployment beneﬁ  ts mostly organised as an insurance for dismissed work-
ers with (a certain amount of) recent labour market experience. Social assistance is a program of last resort 
for families that are lacking income and are not entitled to any other form of beneﬁ  ts. Unemployment 
beneﬁ  ts are usually temporary, with beneﬁ  t levels depending on former wage and not means tested1. Social 
assistance is usually ﬂ  at rate, means tested and for an inﬁ  nite period of time.
Beneﬁ  t administration and public employment services used to be administered by separate agencies 
(OECD 2003). Active labour market policy was often concentrated in a national public employment service 
agency that serves both social assistance recipients and the unemployment beneﬁ  t recipients. In response 
to a rising number of beneﬁ  t recipients and a shift in the political climate, unemployment beneﬁ  ts in many 
countries have been sobered down and activation has gained importance. Additionally, institutions have 
been changed. A signiﬁ  cant institutional change that has appeared in a range of countries is the so-called 
‘one stop shopping’ design. In this one-stop shop agencies administering beneﬁ  ts and agencies carrying out 
active labour market policies have been integrated. The idea behind this design is that people who claim a 
beneﬁ  t can be guided towards work as soon as possible, for instance by ‘work-ﬁ  rst’ strategies (Clasen et al. 
2001). 
A ﬁ  rst example of the one-stop shopping design is found in the UK. Here, the responsibilities for ad-
ministrating beneﬁ  ts and active labour market policy for both persons on unemployment beneﬁ  ts and social 
assistance have been integrated in 2002 in one national body, the Job Centre Plus. This is an executive agency 
of the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). The employees of the Job Centre Plus are ﬁ  nancially 
rewarded for hitting targets at district level for multiple tasks. These targets include job placements, accuracy 
of beneﬁ  t calculation, customer service and employer service (Burgess et al. 2003). 
A next example is found in Denmark. Here, the public employment service (PES) serves persons on 
social assistance and those receiving unemployment beneﬁ  ts, both in terms of job search assistance and 
beneﬁ  t provision. Since 2007 the public employment agency is completely decentralized to the municipali-
ties, but unemployment beneﬁ  ts are still fully reimbursed by the central government. The municipality has a 
1  Exceptions in the European context are the UK, Ireland, Iceland, Poland and Lithuania, where unemployment beneﬁ  ts are ﬂ  at 
rates, which in the case of the UK and Ireland are means tested as well. In Finland unemployment beneﬁ  t level are calculated 
as a combination of a ﬂ  at rate plus a percentage of the previously earned wage.Page ● 10
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ﬁ  nancial incentive for job placements of the unemployed on social assistance, because they pay 50% of the 
allowances. The other half is reimbursed by the state. 
A third example of the one-stop shop design can be found in the Netherlands. Here, the responsibilities 
for carrying out active labour market policies have been integrated with the responsibilities for administering 
beneﬁ  ts. Unlike the UK, the responsibility for unemployment beneﬁ  ts and social assistance is split. Munici-
palities are ﬁ  nancially responsible for the expenditures on social assistance. They have a ﬁ  xed budget for 
the beneﬁ  ts and therefore experience a ﬁ  nancial incentive to reduce the number of beneﬁ  t recipients, e.g. 
by offering job search assistance. A central body (UWV) is responsible for the administration of beneﬁ  ts 
and job search assistance to individuals eligible to unemployment insurance beneﬁ  ts. This body has no ﬁ  -
nancial incentives to get the unemployed back to work: beneﬁ  ts are reimbursed by the central government. 
The government stimulates UWV and municipalities to work together in order to get people back to work. 
So the Dutch model is moving in the direction of the Danish model, although separate agencies remain 
responsible for their own group of unemployed. 
These three cases indicate that countries have chosen different solutions to the same problem: how 
to integrate beneﬁ  t administration and active labour market policies on the one hand and two groups of 
unemployed on the other hand. Integration of beneﬁ  t administration and active labour market policy has 
been widely accepted as being advantageous. Nevertheless, it might have some drawbacks, such as neglect-
ing certain tasks that a party is not ﬁ  nancially responsible for. 
This paper analyses the integration of active labour market policies for the two groups of unemployed 
from a theoretical perspective. We evaluate welfare in several alternative institutional settings:
a)  Regional organizations (municipalities) are responsible for beneﬁ  t administration and active labour 
market policies for both groups of unemployed.
b)  One central organization is responsible for the beneﬁ  t administration and active labour market poli-
cies for both groups of unemployed (like the UK).
c)  Active labour market policies for the two groups is the responsibility of two separate organiza-
tions that are also responsible for the beneﬁ  ts administration of the two groups (like the Nether-
lands).
d)  Active labour market policies are a joint effort of two separate organizations, which are responsible 
for the beneﬁ  t administration (like in Denmark).
In this paper we ask the question which models performs best. We build a principal – agent model in Page ● 11
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order to determine in what form beneﬁ  t administration  and active labour market policy can best be organ-
ized. The principal is the central government whose goal is to maximize social welfare. The principal hires 
-dependent on the choice of organizational form- one or more agents to perform the tasks of beneﬁ  t 
administration and active labour market policy. In determining the organizational form that produces maxi-
mum aggregate utility, the principal faces several trade-offs. 
Each organizational structure has its advantages and disadvantages compared to other organizational 
structures. The advantage of one type of organization (either central or regional) that serves both groups 
of beneﬁ  t recipients is that all effects of active labour market policy can be internalized, which increases the 
ﬁ  nancial returns on job placements. The advantage of one central organization for beneﬁ  t administration 
and active labour market policy above multiple regional organisations lies in the bigger scale. The advantage 
of regional agents, on the other hand, is that they can be benchmarked, which creates opportunities for 
ﬁ  nancial incentives.
Two separate organisations serving the two groups of beneﬁ  t recipients separately has the disadvan-
tage that the effort of one agent leaks  away in cases where the unemployment beneﬁ  ts are expired and the 
individual subsequently starts claiming social assistance.. This decreases incentives for the organization re-
sponsible for unemployment beneﬁ  ts to offer job search assistance to recipients approaching the maximum 
beneﬁ  t duration. On the other hand, a disadvantage of joint active labour market policy for both groups of 
unemployed is that free riding might occur. But on the positive side an advantage might be that cost savings 
occur. However, cost savings have to be substantial to offset the effect of lower incentives.  If this model is 
chosen it is best to let the regional agents serve all unemployed and the central agent none (like in Denmark). 
This is because effort of the central agent leaks away to the regional agent, but not the other way around.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes model A with only regional agents. Section 3 
presents the model with one central agent. Section 4 describes model C, where active labour market policy 
for the two groups is the responsibility of two separate organizations, which are also responsible for the 
beneﬁ  ts administration of the separate groups. Section 5 presents the model in which the two types of 
agents co-operate. Section 6 concludes.Page ● 12
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2. Regional  organizations 
This section presents the model in which all tasks – beneﬁ  t administration and providing job search 
assistance – for both groups of beneﬁ  t recipients – unemployment beneﬁ  t recipients and social assistance 
recipients – are organised by regional organizations such as municipalities. In this model all beneﬁ  t recipi-
ents are served by regional agents. Each regional agent is denoted by subscript i which is contained in the 
set {1,…,N}. There are N regions, and thereby N regional agents. Each regional agent is rewarded for the 
extent to which the outﬂ  ow of beneﬁ  ts recipients in his region exceeds the average outﬂ  ow of beneﬁ  t re-
cipients in all regions. Hence, agent i receives a reimbursement Wi which can be deﬁ  ned as follows:
Wi = 
ୟ




୒   
  
Where: 
Wi is reimbursement of regional agent i
a is ﬁ  xed compensation
b is compensation per unit of outﬂ  ow
c is payment of the agent to the principal per unit of outﬂ  ow
yi is the outﬂ  ow out of unemployment in region i and deﬁ  ned as:
yi=ti+ei+x
With,
ti is the agent i’s effort level and ti ≠ tj for all i ≠ j and i, j contained in {1,…,N}
x ~N(z, χ2) and represents the exogenous exit in region i
χ2 is constant in the number of unemployed, therefore each agent faces the same variance, independent of 
it’s size.
ei ~ ܰሺͲǡሺȀሻ௙ɐ୧
ଶሻ  where 
U is the exogenous number of unemployed
f  is contained in the interval [0,1]. Hence, if f>0 Var(ei) decreases if the number of unemployed (U) goes 
up or the number of regions (N) increases: if f=0, then Var(ei)=σi
2 and if f=1, then Var(ei)=(N/U)σi
2. Since 
U>N, the variance is smaller in the latter. This means a bigger agent faces less risk. Page ● 14
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The cost function of agent i is:
Ci = ½ ti
2(U/N)α
If α=1, then there are no economies of scale. The cost of effort depends on the number of unemployed. 
In case α=0, then there do exist economies of scale: the cost of effort does not depend on the number of 
unemployed.
2.1. Effort  level
The agent is assumed to be risk averse. To simplify calculations later on it is assumed that the agent has 
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences.2 Agent i’s utility function is exponential and given by:
u(Wi – Ci)= െ݁ିrሺWiିCiሻ 
where r > 0 is the amount of risk aversion of agent i. Hence, all agents are presumed to have the same 
amount of risk aversion.
In order to calculate the optimal effort level ti, agent i will maximize his expected utility E[u(Wi – Ci)]. Since 
the utility function exhibits CARA, it is easier to maximize the certainty equivalent of E[u(Wi – Ci)]. The 




୒+ b (ti+ ei+x) – c
σ ሺ୲౟ାୣ౟ା୶ሻ ొ
౟సభ
୒   –  ½ rb2(N/U)f Ƴi2 -½ rb2Ʒ 2 – ½ ti2 (U/N)ơ 
The regional agent cannot inﬂ  uence the average outﬂ  ow of all agents if N is large. So in case N is large, the 
term  σ ሺ୲౟ାୣ౟ା୶ሻ ొ
౟సభ
୒   in the certainty equivalent is a constant (and becomes zero). Assuming N is large, it can 
be calculated that the amount of effort that maximizes the utility of the regional agent is3:
ti* = b(N/U)α
2   Utility functions with CARA preferences, such as an exponential utility function, exhibit ‘nice’ mathematical properties which 
simplify calculations. For example: for a utility function with CARA preferences maximising expected utility is similar to maxi-
mizing mean-variance utility. The mean-variance utility which is the certainty equivalent of the expected utility can be easily 
obtained from a function with CARA preferences.
3  In order to calculate the optimal effort level which maximizes utility, the ﬁ  rst order derivative of CEi with respect to ti is cal-
culated and set to zero. Page ● 15
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2.2. Total  welfare
The principal is risk-neutral. The utility of the principal is:
GP = - σ ሺ ே
௜ୀଵ U/N-yi)B - σ ሺ ே
௜ୀଵ 
ୟ





Where B is the unemployment beneﬁ  t.
The ﬁ  rst part of the equation is the disutility of the principal of paying the unemployment beneﬁ  ts of the 
unemployed minus the unemployed that ﬂ  ow out. The second part is the disutility of the principal of paying 
all the regional agents. 
Total welfare of the principal plus the agent sums up to:
GP+CEi= - UB+σ i
ே
௜ୀଵ B – σ ሺ ே
௜ୀଵ ½ rb2(N/U)f Ƴi2 +½ rb2Ʒ 2 + ½ ti2 (U/N)ơ) 
The reimbursement of the agent falls out of this equation because it is a utility for the agent but a disutility 
of the principal. 
Inserting the optimal amount of effort of the agent yields:
GP+CERA=- UB+ σ ሺ ே
௜ୀଵ (N/U)ơ +ei+x)B– ½ rb2(N/U)f σ ɐ୧
ଶ ୒
୧ୀଵ  -½ Nrb2Ʒ 2 – ½ b2 N1+ơ/Uơ 
The principal will maximize total welfare with respect to b. The optimal compensation b maximizing total 
welfare can be calculated as: 
b= BN1+ơ/(rN1+fUơ-fƳi2 + NUơrƷ 2 + N1+ơ) 
Inserting the optimal b in the optimal level of effort yields:
ti* = BN1+2ơ/(rN1+fU2ơ-fƳi2 + NU2ơrƷ 2 + N1+ơUơ) 
This implies:
  ● An agent yields more effort if there are strong economies of scale or if the variance in output caused 
by effort decreases strongly with the number of unemployed served. 
  ● If r or σi
2 or χ increase the costs of risk increase. In that case it is welfare enhancing to set the com-
pensation per unemployed (b) lower and the ﬁ  xed compensation (a) higher. If b goes down effort is 
lower.  Page ● 16
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  ● if B is higher effort goes up because the principal will set the compensation per out ﬂ  owed unem-
ployed (b) higher.Page ● 17
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3. Central  organization 
In this model all unemployed are served by the central agent.  This model is a special case of the model 
with regional agents, that is for N=1. 








When N is 1 this becomes:
Wc=a+(b-c)yc
The cost function of the central agent is:





3.1. Effort  level
The utility of the central agent is:
f(Wc – Cc)= – e-r(Wc– Cc)
The certainty equivalent of Wi – Ci= 
CERA= a+(b-c)yc –½ rb2(N/U)f σc
2 -½ rb2χ 2 – ½ tc
2 (U/N)α
The agent supplies the amount of effort which maximizes utility. 
CE’t = (b-c) -tUα
So the amount of effort that maximizes the utility of the central agent is:
tc=(b-c)/UαPage ● 18
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3.2. Total  welfare
Total welfare of the principal plus the agent sums up to:
GP+CECA= -UB+ycB –½ r(b-c)2(1/U)f σc2 -½ r(b-c)2χ 2- ½ tc
2 Uα
Inserting the optimal amount of effort of the central agent yields:
GP+CECA=-UB+B ((b-c)/Uα+ec+x)– ½ r(b-c)2(1/U)f σc
2 -½ r(b-c)2χ 2 -½(b-c)2(1/U)α
The principal will maximize total welfare with respect to b. The optimal compensation b maximizing total 
welfare then can be calculated as:  
b= B/(rUα-fσ2 +rUαχ 2 +1)+c
compare this with te optimal compensation of the regional agent:
b= BN1+α/(rN1+fUα-fσi
2 + NUαrχ 2 + N1+α)
If in this equation the number of regions is set on 1 this would yield an optimal compensation of:
b= B/(rUα-fσi
2 + Uαrχ 2 + 1)
The compensation of the central agent is c higher than the compensation of the regional agents. The com-
pensation of the central agent has to be higher because it’s effort cannot be compared with the effort of 
other agents. Whereas a regional agent is only rewarded for it’s own outﬂ  ow minus the average outﬂ  ow  of 
all agents, the central agent is rewarded for all outﬂ  ow. 
Inserting the optimal b in the optimal level of effort yields:
tc*=B/(rU2α-fσ2 +rU2αχ 2 +Uα)
Compare the effort of the central agent with the effort of the regional agent:
ti* = BN1+2α/(rN1+fU2α-fσi
2 + NU2αrχ 2 + N1+αUα)
So the welfare maximizing effort of a central agent is higher than that of  a regional agent if there are strong Page ● 19
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economies of scale or if the variance in output caused by effort decreases strongly with the number of un-
employed served. If economies of scale are not strong and the variance in output caused by effort does not 
strongly decrease with the number of unemployed administration by regional agents yields more welfare. 
But compared with the regional agents the central agent needs a higher reimbursement. This is not efﬁ  cient 
because taxes would have to go up because of this extra reimbursement. Although the compensation of the 
agent is considered a welfare neutral redistribution from principal to agent in the model, in reality it dimin-
ishes welfare because it distorts choices of those who pay the taxes.   
To decrease this welfare diminishing effect the principal might try to seek information about the exogenous 
level of outﬂ  ow (x) and set a minimum target of outﬂ  ow for which the agent is not rewarded. Each period 
the actual output of the agent reveals information to the principal about x. So a high level of effort of the 
central agent and a high level of outﬂ  ow might induce the principal to set the minimum target higher in the 
next period. 
However the central agent can anticipate on future targets set by the principal. This decreases his incentives 
to perform (the ratchet effect, see Weitzman 1980). A regional agent cannot anticipate on future targets 
because it would not only have to anticipate on future behaviour of the principal but also on the future 
behaviour of all other regional agents. Because of the ratchet effect the central agent cannot be given strong 
incentives. Page ● 20
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4.  One central agent and multiple 
regional agents
In this model there are two types of agents and one principal. The ﬁ  rst agent is a central agent. The 
second type of agent is a regional agent. There are multiple regional agents. We assume unemployed are ﬁ  rst 
served by the central agent and after a while, if they have not ﬂ  own out, are transferred tot a regional agent. 
This is a common model in many countries (among which the Netherlands), where unemployed with recent 
labour market experience are entitled to an unemployment beneﬁ  t for a ﬁ  xed amount of time. The unem-
ployment beneﬁ  t is often administered by a central agent. When this period expires and they have not found 
a job they are often entitled tot social assistance, administrated by municipalities.
The problem in this model is that effort of the central agent to get the unemployed back to work is not 
rewarded if the unemployed ﬁ  nds a job after the ﬁ  xed period of entitlement has expired. In that case the 
unemployed has already been transferred to the regional agent and subsequently ﬁ  nds a job due to the effort 
of the central agent. 
So the compensation scheme of the central agent becomes:
Wc =a+(1-γ)(b-c)yc
where γ is the fraction of unemployed that is transferred to the regional agent and subsequently ﬁ  nds a job 
due to the effort of the central agent.
The regional agent on the other hand is rewarded at the moment the unemployed ﬂ  ows out. So the com-
pensation scheme of the regional agent becomes. 
Wc =a+(1-ƣ)(b-c)yc 
where  pg g
Wi =
ୟ











୒ Page ● 22
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The optimal effort of the regional agent does not change because the extra compensation does not depend 
on the effort of the regional agent. However, the effort of the central agent decreases because the compen-
sation for effort decreases. Part of the compensation leaks away to the regional agent. The optimal effort 
of the central agent now becomes:
tc=(1-γ)(b-c)/Uα
This model therefore yields less welfare than a model where there is only one type of agent. Only when the 
groups of unemployed (1) differ substantially in economies of scale and (2) in the degree in which variance 
in output caused by effort decreases with the number of unemployed served it might be welfare enhancing 
to have two different agents for the tow groups. And even than this will only be the case in the absence of 
the ratchet effect. Page ● 23
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5.  Active labour market policy is a joint 
effort of two separate organizations 
The reimbursement schemes of the central and decentralized agent in this model are the same as in the 
benchmark model. The only difference with the benchmark model is that the active labour market policy is a 
shared activity. This means the output of the central and regional agents is now produced by the joint effort 
of both agents. So the central agent has both unemployed with an unemployment beneﬁ  t as unemployed 
on social assistance in his active labour market program. The same holds for regional agents. The central 
agent is rewarded for all unemployed on unemployment beneﬁ  ts that ﬂ  ow out, irrespective if they ﬂ  ow out 
because of the effort of the central agent or the regional agent. Suppose h is the fraction of the unemployed 
on unemployment beneﬁ  t and (1-h) is non social assistance.  If the central agent puts in a share s of the 
joint effort and the decentralized agent puts in share (1-s) the output function of the central agent becomes:







The ﬁ  rst part of the equation is the ﬁ  xed compensation which is assumed to be not affected by coopera-
tion with the regional agents. The second part of the equation is the compensation for outﬂ  ow of the un-
employed on an unemployment beneﬁ  t served by the central agent (minus the unemployed that ﬂ  ow out 
after the transfer to the regional agent). The third part is the reward of the central agent for outﬂ  ow of the 
unemployed served by the regional agents (again minus the unemployed that ﬂ  ow out after the transfer to 
the regional agent).
If both groups have the same characteristics in terms of economies of scale and the degree in which vari-
ance in output caused by effort decreases with the number of unemployed the costs of effort do not change 
compared to the former model where both groups are served by different agents. 
It’s easy to see that the optimal amount of effort of the central agent decreases because part of it’s own 
output is not rewarded.  A part of the reward  is obtained by effort of the regional agent. The central agent 
does not have to put effort in to obtain this reward. In other words: it can free ride on the effort of the 
regional agent. Optimal effort of the central agent becomes: 
tc*=sh(1-γ)(b-c)/UαPage ● 24
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This is a fraction (sh) smaller than in case of no joint effort of two agents.
The regional agent is rewarded for all unemployed on social assistance that ﬂ  ow out. So the compensation 








The regional agent gets a ﬁ  xed compensation a (ﬁ  rst term of the equation) plus compensation for the out-
ﬂ  ow of unemployed on social assistance which are served by the regional agent (second term), plus com-
pensation for the outﬂ  ow of unemployed on social assistance which are served by the central agent (third 
term). Moreover the regional agent gets compensation for the outﬂ  ow of unemployed on an unemployment 
beneﬁ  t after their transfer to social assistance (terms four and ﬁ  ve). The last term indicates that regional 
agents have some compensation for the unemployed on an unemployment beneﬁ  t which they serve, be-
cause they ﬂ  ow out after the transfer to social assistance. 
So the regional agent is rewarded for the effort of the central agent, but part of it’s own effort is not re-
warded. However, part of it’s effort for the unemployed on unemployment beneﬁ  t leaks away to itself. So 
the optimal effort of the regional agent becomes:
ti
* = (1-s)h(1+γ)b(N/U)α
If the two organisations do not work together the effort of the regional agent would have been: 
ti
* = b(N/U)α
The effort of the regional agent in case of cooperation will be bigger than in case of no cooperation if 
(1-s)h(1+γ)>1.
Because in the model it is assumed that effort leaks away only from the central agent to the regional agent 
a model where regional agents serve all unemployed (s=0) is better than a model where part of the unem-
ployed are served by the central agent. Page ● 25
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If s=0 the effort of the regional agent becomes:
ti
* = h(1+γ)b(N/U)α
which is bigger than the effort in case of no cooperation if h>1/(1+γ). This is only the case if either γ is 
very high or if almost all unemployed are on unemployment beneﬁ  t. However if γ is high the there will also 
be a large population on social assistance, which makes this prerequisite very unlikely.
So because of the free riding this model performs worse than a model where agents do not work together. 
This model abstracts from possible cost savings because the unemployed are not transferred any more from 
one agent to another. This saves time of both the agents and the unemployed. The model also abstracts 
from a possible efﬁ  ciency gain due to the fact that the agent follows a person for a longer time. However, 
the effort that leaks away because of transferring does not alter, because the compensation schemes do not 
change. Page ● 26
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6. Conclusion
In general a model with only one type of agent performs better than a model with two types of agents. 
This is because part of the effort of one agent leaks away to the other agent and decreases the incentives 
to get the unemployed back to work. A model where two agents work together and serve both types of un-
employed performs even worse. This is because they are only partially compensated for their effort, which 
decreases the incentives to get the unemployed back to work even more. 
As in every model we made some abstractions from reality. We did not include multiple tasks of agents. The 
agents in our model only have to guide the unemployed back to work as soon as possible. Agents however 
also have other tasks, like ensuring the unemployed get the right beneﬁ  t or allowance at the right time. Re-
warding only one task might harm the other task that is not rewarded. This effect is stronger, the stronger 
the ﬁ  nancial incentive is. 
Another abstraction is the assumption that the regional agents are homogeneous. The budget of the agents 
is calculated as the total budget divided by the number of agents. In reality the allocation of budgets over 
agents is much more complicated, because they all differ in the characteristics of their population and in the 
characteristics of the regional labour market. Therefore the number of unemployed per agent is not exactly 
predictable and agents might be allocated budgets which are too low or too high. Budgets that are too low 
might lead to negative effects on other tasks of the agent. 
Although our model has its limitations it shows clearly some trade-offs that have to be taken into account in 
choosing an organisational model for active labour market policy. More effectiveness because of larger scale 
comes with less ﬁ  nancial incentives. Joint effort of separate agents creates free riding. Page ● 28
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